Geopolitics—Not Just Summits—Will Shape the Transition to Clean Energy

In the waning days of 2023, likely the warmest year the earth has experienced in recorded history, nearly 100,000 people came together in the United Arab Emirates—one of the world’s largest oil and gas producers—to reach a consensus on how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The final agreement at the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai, also known as COP28, was hailed for calling for a transition away from fossil fuels. “Whilst we didn’t turn the page on the fossil fuel era in Dubai, this outcome is the beginning of the end,” proclaimed the UN climate chief, Simon Stiell, after the agreement was announced.

Although the COP28 agreement does offer some cause for optimism on progress on climate change, it fell short of the breakthrough suggested by Stiell’s hyperbole. Still, the outcomes of COP28 more broadly hold some promise for the transition away from fossil fuels—if not necessarily in the ways advertised. A closer look at the language of the official agreement suggests that some of what was agreed to is less significant than meets the eye, whereas other, seemingly innocuous language could have real consequences for the transition.

Nevertheless, much of the real work needed to advance the energy transition falls outside the realm of the UN climate negotiating mechanism. Although there were numerous meaningful policy and technology announcements, geopolitics got short shrift in the two-week agenda, given how instrumental they are in enabling or thwarting the transition. Leaders interested in accelerating the energy transition must work to mitigate traditional sources of tension and address national security threats. A fracturing geopolitical landscape—as much as the growth in climate finance or even advancements in climate technology—will determine just how quickly (or how slowly) the transition to net-zero emissions proceeds.

MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

Like many negotiators before them, the diplomats at COP were able to build consensus by allowing for a certain amount of strategic ambiguity. Successful agreements often feature vague language open to conflicting interpretations, in recognition that a clearer agreement is not yet possible and in the hope that when differing interpretations eventually clash, circumstances will allow for new possibilities. In crafting the Good Friday Agreement, which ended the violence in Northern Ireland, for instance, U.S. Senator George Mitchell got the parties to agree that the region would remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority of its citizens desired it. The Protestants who made up more than half the population saw this provision as confirming the Britishness of the area; the faster-growing but still minority Catholic population saw it as a promise of a future united Ireland.

In a similar fashion, the 198 countries at COP28 agreed on “transitioning away from fossil fuels.” The countries most vulnerable to climate change can point to this language as consistent with their demand that the agreement call for the “phaseout” of fossil fuels. At the same time, oil-producing states can argue that the agreement reflects their preference for a gradual decline in fossil fuel use but leaves open the possibility that the world can avoid complete elimination of that dependence by relying on technologies for carbon capture or removal. Moreover, the language seems to place the onus on energy consumers as well as energy producers, suggesting that reducing demand for fossil fuels is as important as tapering production.

The reality is that achieving the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 will require a very steep and immediate decline in fossil fuel use—although not a complete elimination, according to projections by the International Energy Agency and others. The IEA has clearly stated that demand must fall in pace with supply. “Simply cutting spending on oil and gas will not get the world on track for the [net-zero by 2050] scenario,” the organization stated in its 2023 World Energy Outlook report. “The key to an orderly transition is to scale up investment in all aspects of a clean energy system.”

Other language agreed to at COP28 might appear to be boilerplate to the casual observer but could have a major impact on the pace of the transition. Most notably, the final agreement emphasizes the need for an “orderly” and “equitable” transition. The new recognition of the risks of a disorderly transition reflects the concerns we have written about before in Foreign Affairs, namely that this process is likely to be jagged and messy from a geopolitical standpoint and that it is essential for foreign and climate policy officials to identify these risks to try to make it less so. But, as highlighted at COP28, this is easier said than done. For example, developing countries struggling with burgeoning energy demands at a time they are being told to bring down their emissions may well point to the COP28 language to justify moving more slowly or even embracing fossil fuels, such as natural gas, before switching to net-zero energy sources.

LOWERING THE TEMPERATURE

To truly understand the impact of COP28 on climate progress, however, one must look beyond the language of the final agreement and consider the geopolitical forces at work behind it. Although geopolitics matters greatly for climate progress, it rarely gets the attention it deserves at climate negotiations. In fact, to the extent to which geopolitics appeared at COP28, it was often to complicate it. Russia, for instance, frustrated the effort to find a suitable eastern European host for the next conference; the United Arab Emirates rolled out the red carpet for Russian President Vladimir Putin just miles away in Abu Dhabi, distracting and irritating American and European negotiators and observers; and OPEC+ countries decided to slash oil production just days before the conference began.

This is not to say that the world cannot make progress on climate in the current geopolitical environment. But just as every tenth of a degree matters in the push to limit the average global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, gradients matter in geopolitics. Every notch of international tension that can be lowered will be helpful for the transition. 

Most important is the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Few remain under any illusion that a rapprochement between Beijing and Washington will be the holy grail that delivers a smooth and rapid clean energy transition. And climate action that takes place in the context of great-power competition can often be effective. But even modest areas of cooperation can make a big difference. At their November 2023 summit, for instance, U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to curb their countries’ methane emissions and triple global renewable energy capacity, which laid the groundwork for broader multilateral agreements on those two issues in Dubai.

Geopolitics rarely gets the attention it deserves at climate negotiations.

By contrast, a deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations could derail the energy transition. Already, concerns about China are leading policymakers in the United States and Europe to limit imports of Chinese clean energy products, which could slow the adoption of these technologies. Even as negotiators met in Dubai, the Biden administration announced new rules that exclude China from the U.S. electric vehicle and battery supply chain. Moreover, the first high-level meeting of European Union and Chinese leaders in four years ended in disappointment, in part over the EU’s complaints about a trade imbalance favoring China, reflected in a decision in October to launch an anti-subsidy investigation into sales of Chinese electric vehicles. Should the wars in Gaza or Ukraine—or the victory of Lai Ching-te, Beijing’s least preferred candidate, in Taiwan’s recent presidential election—spike tensions further, the impact on the energy transition could be severe.

U.S-Chinese tensions also contribute to a march away from global economic integration, which risks raising the costs of clean energy and the diffusion of related technologies and slowing the energy transition. To be sure, unfettered low-cost supply chains are not an end in themselves. Countries should push back on unfair trade practices, challenge human rights violations such as China’s use of forced labor in solar manufacturing, and bolster supply chains by diversifying them. But states also risk going too far toward protectionism in the name of energy security and resilience.

The world must also counter or work around the rise of political forces that undermine stronger climate efforts. With more than half the world’s population voting in elections in 2024, the global climate agenda could be set back if far-right parties unsupportive of climate action—and often outright rejecting the scientific reality of climate change—come to power. Such a shift may already be taking place. Even as climate negotiators were meeting in Dubai, the far-right Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders defeated the left-wing alliance led by Frans Timmermans, the architect of Europe’s climate policy, on an anti-environmentalist platform. Argentina’s new leader, Javier Milei, has called climate change “a socialist lie.” In France, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, and elsewhere in Europe, far-right parties are gaining ground. Reversing this trend demands in part that governments do not pursue climate action without regard for energy security. But it also requires policies to address feelings of powerlessness related to discontent over lost jobs, high inflation, and a potentially destabilizing influx of immigrants.

CLIMATE ACTION, MEET FOREIGN POLICY

The past year has offered painful reminders that war and conflict can also sap the resources, attention, and stamina necessary for the challenging clean energy transition ahead. With governments allocating massive amounts of scarce resources to defense and warfighting in places such as Israel and Ukraine, there are fewer funds left to scale up support for accelerating the deployment of clean energy. And with the conflict between Israel and Hamas showing signs of escalating, including clashes with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and with Houthi forces in Yemen and the Red Sea, policymakers concerned about keeping gasoline prices in check—particularly in an election year—will prioritize retaining access to oil supplies to calm jittery markets. The risks of a slower transition, in turn, will feed those same sources of conflict in the long run, as climate change exacerbates natural disasters, fuels conflict over scarce water supplies and mineral and energy resources, and drives migration into countries where the far right is on the rise.

Integration of climate action and foreign policy—at COP and elsewhere—is still too rare. There were still relatively few foreign policy professionals in Dubai in December 2023, and even fewer climate leaders can be found at the most significant national security and foreign policy gatherings. That needs to change, as geopolitics and foreign policy will both shape and be shaped by climate change and efforts to accelerate the clean energy transition. Successfully navigating today’s geopolitical problems and risks is important not only for the sake of peace and stability but also to drive faster climate action.

CORRECTION APPENDED (January 19, 2024)

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article incorrectly stated that Geert Wilders had been sworn in as the prime minister of the Netherlands by the end of 2023. His party had won the Dutch general elections, but he has not been sworn in as Prime Minister.